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Abstract 
In this paper, the aim is to shed further light on issues of citizenship in the period 
between 1951 and 1971, often called the founding period of European integration. 
The contribution of the paper to the literature is two-fold. First, in theoretical terms it 
contributes by studying citizenship as a status of individuals in relation to a political 
unit differentiated analytically into four dimensions: Membership, identity, rights and 
participation. This amounts to a more dynamic approach than previous studies as it 
focuses on the interplay between dimensions rather than solely on rights or identity. 
Second, connecting these dimensions to the empirical, it contributes by highlighting 
those treaties, legislative measures and practices that are linked to the emergence, 
consolidation and/or change to the status of individuals within the system. The 
analysis finds that that we can fruitfully talk about a kind of citizenship in the first 
period of European integration. It must, however, not be overstated as anything 
resembling a full-blown citizenship status akin to national citizenship. European 
citizenship should rather be understood in its own right, as a citizenship gradually 
emerging from the founding treaties, judicial activism of the ECJ and free movement 
legislation. 
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1 
Introduction 
As the “group of six”1 established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 
1951, no-one could foresee a European Union (EU) of 25 Member States, with a 
European Parliament (EP), wide-reaching common policies and a common currency.2 
For sure, we can imagine that they would also not have foreseen all the talk about 
citizenship that has emerged after Union citizenship was institutionalised in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992). After all, the prevailing understanding has been to link one 
citizen and one nation-state with one prevailing national identity (see for instance 
Heater 1999; Schnapper 1998). 
 
Indeed, in one of the first articles that dealt explicitly with the interface concerning 
citizenship and the European Economic Community (EEC), the French sociologist 
Raymond Aron (1974: 653) succinctly stated: “[T]here are no such animals as 
‘European citizens.’ There are only French, German, or Italian citizens.” In this 
reading, due to the lack of explicit rights of a political character, a “European” 
citizenship was neither descriptively visible, nor theoretically viable. In Aron’s 
analysis, political rights are seen as unequivocally national in character – and 
separated from other types of rights in their significance for the ethos of citizenship 
(Aron 1974: 642ff., 651).   
 
Contrary to this, it has been argued from a legal point of view that “an incipient form 
of European citizenship” developed already in the first treaties and through ensuing 
political practices (Plender 1976). This has been corroborated by studies that have 
focused on the institutional construction of “citizenship practice” from the 1970s 
onwards (Wiener 1998) or on identity issues raised by the relationship between the 
emerging European polity and individual citizens (Kostakopoulou 2001). The 
sceptical stance of Aron has also been opposed by Willem Maas (2005), who in a 
recent article on “the genesis of European rights” argues that the study of European 
citizenship should focus on understanding and explaining the development of rights 
from the outset of European integration in the ECSC and Rome Treaties.  
 
In this paper, the aim is to shed further light on issues of citizenship in the period 
between 1951 and 1971, often called the founding period of European integration (see 
Jachtenfuchs et al 1998; Kostakopoulou 2001). The contribution of the paper to the 
literature is two-fold. First, in theoretical terms by studying citizenship as a status of 
individuals in relation to a political unit differentiated analytically into four 
dimensions: Membership, identity, rights and participation. This amounts to a more 
dynamic approach than those of Maas and Kostakopoulou as it focuses on the 
interplay between dimensions rather than solely on rights or identity. Second, 
connecting these dimensions to the empirical, it contributes by highlighting those 
treaties, legislative measures and practices that are linked to the emergence, 
consolidation and/or change to the status of individuals within the system. The
                                                 
1
 A phrase often used about the six founding members of the institutions of European integration: 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany. 
2
 Notwithstanding the clearly federal aspirations of many pro-integrationists in the immediate Post-War 
period, including calls from the Movimento Federalista Europeo for the creation of a European 
‘continental’ citizenship co-existent with national citizenship (Maas 2005; for broader historical 
accounts, see Dinan 2004; Gillingham 2003; Griffiths 2000; for personal accounts, see Nelsen and 
Stubb 2003). 
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 following instances stand out in terms of raising issues pertaining to the relation 
between the European polity and individuals: the ECSC and Rome Treaties, ECJ 
jurisprudence in the 1960s and free movement legislation in the 1960s/1970s. By 
focusing on such instances it will become apparent how an issue like citizenship is not 
conjured up ex nihilo, but is rather a phenomenon which emerges, evolves and 
changes in conjunction with concrete practices of a political system. Based on such 
considerations, tracing the historicity of citizenship will also provide some 
preliminary clues for studying the developments after the insertion of Union 
citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty.  
 
The paper will proceed as follows. First, the theoretical framework for exploring and 
understanding conceptions of citizenship will be presented. As citizenship is a very 
much contested and normatively laden concept, attention will be directed to how 
focusing on four analytical dimensions cover different aspects and questions raised by 
the concept. In defining each dimension, attention will also be directed to how they 
can work in operational terms providing empirical indicators for the study of 
(European) citizenship. Second, in the empirical part of the paper, four different 
instances within the initial period of European integration will be scrutinised to the 
extent of how they have affected – in conceptual terms – the status of individuals 
within the system. In doing so, the focus will be on illuminating how dimensions of 
citizenship were explicitly or implicitly invoked in each instance and how these were 
translated into time-specific conceptions of citizenship. Further, with regard to the 
empirical analysis, the trajectory of citizenship conceptions in the period will be 
discussed, with specific attention to similarities and differences between the instances. 
Third, in providing concluding remarks, the findings of the analysis will be linked to 
broader theoretical projections and questions concerning the state of European 
citizenship. 
 
Theorising Citizenship: Defining Dimensions 
On the most general level I will define citizenship as a status of individuals tied to a 
political unit. With this in mind, the concept of citizenship involves issues both of 
individuality and collectivity (Heater 1999). Citizenship would hold no meaning if it 
was devoid of a collective component – it is always granted by some political unit (see 
Walzer 1983). In fact, it is exactly at the interface relating the individual with a 
political unit that conceptions of citizenship arise. As there is an extra-individual unit 
that decides on citizenship, we must investigate the practices through which the unit 
or political system has affected the status of individuals.  
 
Stating that citizenship is a status of individuals does, however, not provide much in 
empirical terms. How is it constituted, that is, what are its constituent parts? As 
Bellamy (2004: 3) has emphasised, “[t]o be recognisable as accounts of citizenship, 
conceptions must share certain common… conceptual features.” I will argue that by 
breaking citizenship down into membership, identity, rights and participation specific 
aspects of its practical reconciliations are more readily observable. The dimensions 
should thus be understood theoretically as complementary facets of citizenship. Each 
of them has an analytically independent status but they are also (potentially) inter-
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related or overlapping at any given moment in a specific conception of citizenship.3 
How and to what extent they are empirically related can then only be ascertained by 
analysing actual citizenship practices. The theoretical point here is more specifically 
that the traits of one dimension often will have a bearing on other dimensions in actual 
practices. By way of a cursory example, the manner in which, say, membership is 
defined and discursively practiced links up with the notion of identity in the 
community “established” by defining members in a certain way. That said, however, 
one cannot rule out that the discourse on identity also has a bearing on how 
membership is defined. Analysing citizenship practices from the vantage point of 
dimensions thus provides the opportunity to flesh out such linkages in polity-specific 
conceptions of citizenship.  
 
Turning to defining the dimensions, I will argue that the question of membership 
connects to the notion of inclusion and exclusion in a political unit (see Brubaker 
1992: 21ff.). It does on some level involve the question of who belongs and who does 
not belong. Through membership, the concept and institution of citizenship “ties” a 
human being to some collective organization presupposing some “self”-understanding 
of the choosing community, it is not only a reflection on the strangers to, but also the 
members of the community (Walzer 1983: 32ff.; see also Isin 2002: 22). Thus, in 
operational terms, membership can be ascertained by identifying who are seen as 
members and on what basis they are included. The notion of membership inherent in 
practical conceptions of citizenship is, then, visible in terms of the criteria by which 
members and non-members are differentiated.  
 
Identity signifies that the boundaries between political units established in terms of 
memberships – “we” are Norwegian, “they” are Swedish or Finnish, or in the EU: 
“we” are European, “they” are American? – raise the further question of what 
constitutes a given community and its more specific “differentials” from other 
communities. The question of identity relates to the questions of “who we are” and 
“what distinguishes us from others” (Taylor 1985: 34). In this sense, identity goes to 
the core of what kind of community citizens are members of. Accordingly, citizenship 
links up, not only with the question of “who are members?”, but also with asking 
“who is what?” (see Brubaker 1992: 182). In operational terms, therefore, identity can 
be discovered by investigating notions of what draws the community of citizens 
together, the way in which membership is framed in terms of belonging and which 
attributes that are used to distinguish between “insiders” and “outsiders.” 
 
As a dimension of citizenship, rights can be defined as the entitlements that derive 
from this status (Bauböck 1994: 233). In simple terms: Citizens have an array of 
rights that non-citizens do not enjoy. Investigating the location of rights within a 
specific discourse can thus provide further clues as to the conception of citizenship 
within a political unit. When assessing conceptions of citizenship, we must investigate 
the extension of rights, that is, who are given which rights – and how exclusive are 
they? Are there clear boundaries between the rights of citizens and non-citizens? And, 
if so, where is the line drawn?  
                                                 
3
 This does obviously not rule out that one or more dimensions are omitted from conceptions of 
citizenship. Thus, the four dimensions highlight the potential of citizenship practices rather than 
stipulating an a priori understanding of citizenship as always consisting of certain attributes linked in a 
fixed way. Focusing on dimensions rather opens up the scope for interpretation of different practices of 
citizenship across time and political space. 
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In addition to these three dimensions, citizenship entails (if not the outright duty, so 
the potential of) citizenly participation. Citizenship does not only have a bearing on 
how the community relates to the citizen, but also on how the citizen relates to the 
community to which she is a member (Carens 2000: 166ff.). In operational terms, 
participation is therefore visible in two ways. First, through what I will call the 
facilitation of voluntary participation. Such facilitation connects to the types of 
participatory rights that are linked to citizenship and how the community promotes 
participation. Second, it is visible in the specification of duties that derive from the 
status of citizenship. Thus, the notion of participation addresses the acting out (or not) 
of citizenship rights and duties within the community. 
 
Table 1. Dimensions of citizenship and empirical indicators 
Dimensions of citizenship Empirical indicators 
 
Membership 
Criteria for who are seen as members (and hence 
non-members) and on what basis 
 
 
Identity 
What kind of community citizenship is linked to 
Notions of what draws the community of citizens 
together 
 
 
Rights  
Extension of rights – exclusivity in terms of who are 
held to have which rights 
Degree of boundary between rights of citizens/non-
citizens 
 
 
Participation 
Facilitation of voluntary participation 
Specification of duties linked to the status of 
citizenship 
 
 
The remarks on dimensions of citizenship and empirical indicators (summarised in the 
table) thus provide fruitful ground for investigating, not only the kinds of conceptions 
of citizenship that emerged in the historical period as a whole, but also for comparing 
different instances and events with a view to illuminate the trajectory of European 
citizenship politics in its first, practical approximations between 1951 and 1971. It is 
to this that I now turn. 
 
European Integration and Conceptions of Citizenship 
ECSC Treaty: Sectoral Integration, Embryonic Citizenship 
The Treaty on the European Steel and Coal Community (ECSC) signed in Paris 
(1951) marks the institutional advent of European integration. Through this treaty, the 
BeNeLux, France, Germany and Italy sought to create a single market in coal and 
steel (Dinan 2004: 52). At the outset, this integrative effort was thus highly sectoral 
and limited, both in political and territorial terms. One could thus argue that issues 
pertaining to individuals and citizenship were not rendered important for European 
integration in its first political and institutional approximation. This is, however, not 
necessarily the case if one studies the text of the ECSC Treaty more carefully. Indeed, 
Maas (2005: 985, 997) has shown that arguments over European rights have been 
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present since the beginning of European integration, even pre-dating the negotiations 
on the ECSC Treaty.  
 
Integrating six countries within the limited fields of coal and steel production, the 
ECSC Treaty was still rather comprehensive in laying out the historical and political 
foundations for such a community. It stated aims of the ECSC such as “maintenance 
of peaceful relations”, “the establishment of common bases for economic 
development”, and to raise “the standard of living and… furthering the works of 
peace.” Finally, it stated that the abolishment of historic rivalries were to be countered 
“by creating an economic community, the foundation of a broad and independent 
community among peoples, … and giving direction to their future common destiny.” 
Obviously, one must be careful of overstated interpretation regarding “lofty” 
considerations in a preamble. Still, it is interesting that the very limited fields of coal 
and steel gave rise to such towering assertions of the “rationale” behind integration. In 
fact, as Dinan (2004: 46) points out, choosing “the word community, rather than 
simply association or organization, connoted common interests that transcended 
economic goals.” In terms of shedding light on the concept of citizenship within the 
treaty, one interesting question is thus whether the assertions of peace and community 
in the broader sense were also raised with regard to the status of individuals within the 
ECSC. 
 
Clearly, there was no direct designation of individual membership in the ECSC 
Treaty. In fact, there was furthermore no direct reference even to rights of individuals 
that could emanate from the treaty. Still, a notion of individuals and their rights did 
figure in it. To the extent that individuals were rendered a status within the framework 
of the treaty, it was primarily in the capacity of consumers, workers or producers.4 It 
seems obvious that within the prevailing understandings of citizenship at the time 
these roles would not be seen as part of citizenship. To be sure, the aforementioned 
scepticism of Raymond Aron (1974) concerning even the conceptual possibility of 
European citizenship as something similar to the national counterpart would possibly 
have rung even more true in 1951. Against this backdrop, Neunreither (1995: 5) could 
be right in claiming that the ECSC represented “European integration without the 
citizens.” Still, I will argue that some issues linked to dimensions of citizenship can be 
read out of the ECSC Treaty.  
 
The thrust of provisions on individuals in the treaty is found in Article 69. This refers 
to the renouncement of employment restrictions based on nationality for workers in 
the coal and steel industries. Hence, the lofty assertions of promoting peace did not 
foster any direct measures to integrate Member State citizens further. There was no 
notion of a European identity common to citizens of diverse nation-states – of what 
drew individuals together in communal terms. The treaty explicitly dealt with the 
status of individuals in their limited capacity as potential workers in a clearly defined 
sector of production and market transactions. The basis for individual membership 
under the ECSC was thus pretty straightforward – it was linked to a given prospective 
activity on the part of individuals, sectorally defined and circumscribed. The rights 
attached to this status as a limited “coal and steel worker-citizen” were further meant 
to facilitate what the treaty referred to as “movement of labour.” In theoretical terms, 
the possibility to move freely across national boundaries constituting the reach of state 
                                                 
4
 ECSC Treaty, Articles 3c, 3e, 4b, 46, 56, 69. 
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jurisdiction and citizenship rights, can be interpreted as the “abolition of the 
disabilities of alienage” (Preuss 1998a: 145). Being an alien – a non-citizen – is then 
no longer such a precarious status given that rights of free movement to some extent 
“trump” the state’s exclusive right to deny the access of foreigners to its territory. But, 
given the clearly limited character of movement provisions under the ECSC, this 
cannot be interpreted as the backbone of a genuine European citizenship status cross-
cutting national citizenship institutions and territorial jurisdictions. The free 
movement provision inherent in Article 69 of the ECSC Treaty was even stated under 
the heading “movement of labour”,5 rather than, say, “free movement of persons” 
which would have signified a broader curbing of the traditional exclusiveness of states 
in terms of territorial control. What this cursory analysis of the first treaty of European 
integration has highlighted is thus that concerning the status of individuals, certain 
narrow issues of citizenship were raised, if not explicitly, so implicitly under the guise 
of the ECSC. As there was no direct designation of individual membership under the 
treaty, the focal point regarding the status of individuals was almost exclusively 
linked to the participation of workers through rights of free movement. At best, this 
can therefore be interpreted as a partial, sectorally defined embryonic citizenship – 
and nothing by way of a more comprehensive conception taking into account different 
dimensions of citizenship. 
 
The Treaty of Rome: Economic Integration, Market Citizenship 
As the ECSC Treaty, notwithstanding its highly sectoral and technocratic mode of 
integration, invoked an embryonic conception of European citizenship based on 
abolishing restrictions based on nationality regarding the movement of workers across 
state boundaries, no less can be expected from the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) through the Treaty of Rome. The designation of the 
new community as “economic” rather than confined to two narrow sectors clearly 
signified the broadened scope of institutionalised European integration. In fact, on the 
back of the failure regarding the European Political Community in 1954 (see Griffiths 
2000), one of the priorities of that process were retained: The establishment of a 
common market in Europe (Dinan 2004: 64). This more complete vision of economic 
integration renders the question of whether the broader scope of integration had 
further ramifications for the status of individuals within the system. Did the 
embryonic citizenship of the ECSC make way for a more complete conception of 
citizenship through the EEC?  
 
The more comprehensive scope of integration inherent in the Treaty of Rome is 
evident in its preamble. The “loftiness” of the preceding treaty was retained, however 
with a somewhat different slant to it. It re-iterated the aims of fostering peace through 
“eliminating the barriers which divide Europe”, by “constantly improving the living 
and working conditions of their [the Member States’] peoples”, and finally “to 
strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty.” What is further striking about the 
preamble in terms of issues regarding citizenship is the emphasis on integration, not 
only between Member State citizens as such, but the determination to establish “an 
ever closer union among the European peoples” (my emphasis). This did not bring the 
single citizen to the forefront of the aims of European integration. Still, the focus on 
peoples rather than merely states did signal the link between the institutions of the 
                                                 
5
 ECSC Treaty, in the title of Chapter VIII: “Wages and Movement of Labor.” 
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integrative process and individuals was not only mediated by the Member State level. 
European integration seems to have signified something more than a simple 
international treaty or regime, it was perceived to have ramifications for the 
collectives of individuals underpinning the Member States in terms of community and 
legitimacy. 
 
It is thus not surprising, notwithstanding the lack of focusing on integration among 
citizens as such, that issues pertaining to the status of individuals were scattered 
throughout the Treaty of Rome. Again, the prevailing image is one of focusing on the 
status of individuals as workers and producers.6 Still, there was some development 
compared to the ECSC. The treaty explicitly stated in Article 7 that “any 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited”, without 
specifying the precise circumstances to which this principle would apply.7 The 
principle of non-discrimination thus seems to have been broader – at least in terms of 
the exact wording of the provision – than a narrow focus on proscribing such 
measures for specific groups, such as workers. The designation of membership, the 
criteria for who were seen as members and on what basis were thus not 
straightforward. On the one hand, it is clear that the treaty establishes the individual as 
meaningful within the framework of European integration in his/her capacity as a 
worker, albeit on a general level. The link was mediated through participation in the 
market and the potential crossing of political borders in order to work within the 
common market. On the other hand, the broad wording of the general article on non-
discrimination points to a tension between a conception of the “worker-citizen” and 
an individual citizen to be protected from discrimination on the basis of her 
nationality per se. There thus seems to have been a tension inherent in the treaty 
between the practical and functional focus on market integration and the broader 
“vision” of overcoming the national divisions of the two wars. 
 
The thrust of individual rights provisions were linked to the principle of free 
movement.8 This was clearly related to the notion of workers as the primary individual 
actors in European integration. Still, it was not a universal principle. Free movement 
could be curtailed by arguing for reasons of public order and public safety. The 
emphasis on exceptions to the principles of free movement and free right of 
establishment based on such reasons underlines that there were no explicit state-
aspirations inherent in the treaty foundation of the EEC. In theorising types of 
boundaries involved in “polity-making” in modern Europe, Bartolini (2006: 7ff., 28) 
has underlined that the limits surrounding market transactions can be seen as fringes, 
that is rather malleable boundaries subject to ongoing developments of market 
relations and practices, while politico-adminstrative units are delineated by more 
settled borders. Thus, the principle regarding free movement of persons facilitating a 
common European market by “abolishing” the fringe boundaries between national 
                                                 
6
 Treaty of Rome, Articles 3, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 92, 117, 119, 123, 220. 
7
 Article 7 further stipulates that the principle of non-discrimination must fall “[w]ithin the field of 
application of this Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein.” A narrow 
interpretation of this could be that as the treaty was geared towards economic integration and 
facilitating a common market, the principle would only apply to individuals as they engaged within 
spheres falling under these specific aspects of European integration. It can, however, also be interpreted 
as a more fundamental individual right under European law stipulating a beginning shift from 
nationality to individuality in ascertaining the worth of citizens and their relationships to collective 
units, be it firms or states (see Menéndéz 2002). 
8
 Treaty of Rome, Article 48. 
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markets could cut across the borders of politico-administrative units previously 
holding exclusive jurisdiction over national territory. In light of the pervasiveness – in 
theoretical and practical terms – regarding the unitary character of modern nation-
states encompassing citizenship, identity, political institutions and territory (see 
Bauböck 2003: 8), principles “over-riding” these inter-locking boundaries were 
clearly powerful. Still, ultimate decisions about citizenship remained national, perhaps 
due to the persistence of statehood in the final instance. As pointed out by Bauböck 
(2003: 8), the “[t]erritorial integrity of states is a deeply entrenched norm in the 
international state system.” Further, the potential challenge to the link between 
individual and political units from free movement was clearly thwarted by the 
concentration on economic integration and market-making in the EEC. The range of 
rights linked to free movement did not entail a deep “intrusion” into the political 
borders of Member States. There was for instance no concept of political rights in the 
treaty. In addition, emphasising that exceptions could be made by reference to reasons 
of public order and public safety clearly show that there was no vocabulary ready at 
the time of the Treaty of Rome to challenge the ultimate boundaries of states and thus 
of national citizenship institutions. 
 
To conclude, then, the answer to “who are the Europeans?” in the vocabulary of the 
Treaty of Rome was obviously not the democratic citizen participating in a political 
community, rather individuals-as-workers in a market. As Preuss (1998b: 11) points 
out, “[t]he political term citizen was thoroughly alien to the wording of the original 
Treaty” (my emphasis). There was no clear notion of a broader identity transcending 
the links generated by integrating markets, common institutions and the legal 
framework on the European level. Still, the tension regarding non-discrimination 
possibly points to at least a broadening of the potential effect of European integration 
on the status of individuals within the system. Still, by and large the Treaty of Rome 
amounted to a very partial conception of citizenship with a heavy emphasis on 
participation in the common market by the potential crossing of previously pervasive 
boundaries of national markets and nation-states.  
 
ECJ Judicial Activism: Partial Citizenship-As-Rights 
Within the literature on European integration, the judicial activism of the ECJ is often 
put forward as one of the main factors in the development of the EU as more than an 
international organisation – as an integrative project with state-like features, but still 
not a state in its own right (for historical appraisals, see Dinan 2004; Gillingham 
2003; for legal-political appraisals, see Conant 2002; MacCormick 1999; Weiler 
1999). Part of the interest regarding the ECJ in the literature stems from its so-called 
seminal decisions in the 1960s establishing the basic principles of supremacy, direct 
effect and protection of fundamental rights within the EU order (Weiler 1999: 19ff.). 
These decisions – and especially those on supremacy and direct effect – were not at 
the outset geared towards the status of individuals within the system. Still, it can be 
argued that the practices – of European law and policies – emanating from them 
signified the establishment of a direct link between the EU as a political unit with 
certain powers and individual citizens “formerly” linked only to their nation-states 
through citizenship (Preuss 1998a; Weiler 1999).  
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Taking the cue from the two seminal cases of Van Gend en Loos9 and Costa10, what is 
most clearly striking about ECJ judicial activism in the 1960s is the vigorous assertion 
of the EU as a legal system in its own right (MacCormick 1999: 113). In terms of 
investigating its impact on the status of individuals, the sceptic could argue that this 
does not tell us much, as ECJ jurisprudence in that period was primarily linked to 
judgements on the specificities of a common market rather than the rights of 
individuals. But, Costa (2003: 740) points out that “[f]rom a legal point of view, 
European integration concerned the citizens at a very early stage.” From the vantage 
point of investigating European citizenship, then, the question is how this legal 
preoccupation with issues concerning rights in the system “translated” into 
noteworthy contributions to citizenship politics in the Community.  
 
In Van Gend en Loos, the Court ruled that “Community law creates rights for citizens 
which national courts must recognise and enforce,” and further emphasised that it has 
“direct effects in the relationship between Member States and their subjects.” In 
Costa, the emphasis was on establishing “precedence of Community law” or 
supremacy as it is referred to in the literature. This was done by affirming that any 
European legal norm overrides national legislation in conflict with it (see further 
Weiler 1999: 20ff.). In one sense, the judgments on direct effect and supremacy can 
be read as partial answers to “who the Europeans are”, that is, the question of what 
binds individuals together within the community of a political unit. It is through 
European rights that individuals are bound together and to the Community in the view 
of the ECJ. These rights further have direct effect within Member States, that is, they 
cannot be mediated through national jurisprudence, but must rather be incorporated as 
such. Through this sweeping judgment, European law thus circumscribed the 
exclusive discretion of nation-states in relation to their citizens’ rights and obligations.  
 
In terms of the subjects that the Court ruled would give rise to individual rights, they 
centred on aspects of the common market such as aid to companies or industrial 
sectors, monopolies, and the right of (commercial) establishment. This does obviously 
not amount to a very “thick” notion of individual identity or citizenship within the 
Community. It is rather the assertion of principles regarding non-discrimination and 
the direct effect of Community law for Member States and thus for citizens, that 
provides the thrust of affecting the status of individuals. This legal development can 
be interpreted as containing broader political implications through establishing that 
the EU could not ascribe duties (to follow European and not only national law) on 
individuals without also granting them certain rights against it (Beetham and Lord 
1998: 112). 
  
What is furthermore interesting regarding citizenship is the assertion that rights 
derived from the European level would have implications on the level of each nation-
state in the system. The Community created a status which cuts across the borders of 
previously insulated legal-political systems in terms of membership and the scope of 
rights. In this sense, the conception of citizenship was not only linked to the European 
level as such, but to two levels – European and national. It was not only transnational 
in the sense of cutting across national boundaries, but also supranational in the sense 
of being superimposed by the European level on national systems. 
                                                 
9
 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Adminstratie der Belastingen, 1963, ECR 1. 
10
 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, 1964, ECR 585. 
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From this discussion, we see that the Court evidently brought conceptual issues 
regarding the status of individuals within the legal-political system of European 
integration to the fore, much more clearly than was the case in the founding treaties. 
The citizen was “established” as significant per se through European rights. In this 
sense, primacy was given to the dimension of rights in locating individuals within the 
system. From the ECJ verdicts, it is further and not surprisingly so, the case that 
individuals were rendered rights as a consequence of national citizenship. The 
membership dimension was settled on the national level in terms of formal 
citizenship, but the European rights can also be interpreted as stipulating a kind of 
membership through (the potential of) participation in the common market. Here, the 
jurisprudence of the Court clearly continued the predominant economic and market-
oriented language of the treaties. Finally, in terms of conceptions of citizenship, what 
is striking is the explicit statement of a direct link between the institutions and policies 
of European integration and individual Member State citizens – a direct link that was 
not explicated in the founding treaties.   
 
Still, one should be somewhat cautious in drawing too sweeping conclusions from 
this. Empirical research regarding the impact of these principles on the actual use of 
individual capacities to legal action for instance, show that these have been utilised to 
a very small extent: “There is still today a persistent cleavage between the theoretical 
individual rights granted by EU integration and the rights that private individuals can 
actually benefit from” (Costa 2003: 744). As a result, empirical findings of this sort 
warn us of inferring anything close to democratic qualities from legal provisions on 
individual rights. Its scope was the private market actor, rather than the public 
political participant. In this manner, it did not significantly develop compared to the 
embryonic and market-oriented conceptions of the ECSC and EEC respectively. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that calling attention to the fact that the Community 
not only dealt with states, but also with individual citizens marked a significant shift 
insofar as it brought about fundamental questions regarding sovereignty and 
autonomy on the macro-level as well as its impact on the bearers of legitimacy in 
modern states – the individual citizens. To conclude, then, the ECJ brought forward a 
conception of partial citizenship-as-rights within a binding legal and political system. 
 
Free Movement Legislation: Citizenship-As-Qualified Residence 
As the analysis of the founding treaties of the Community and ECJ jurisprudence have 
highlighted, the status of individuals within this system were primarily linked to rights 
for citizens qua workers and more specifically to the issue of free movement. In the 
first phase, European integration was undoubtedly geared towards economic 
integration, albeit as a means for further integration of previously warring states. 
Issues pertaining to dimensions of citizenship were further raised in legislative 
measures regarding free movement towards the end of the 1960s. Hence, the 
foundation through treaties and legal struggles over their interpretation yielded more 
specific policy measures. Through creeping fashion, then, practices linked to 
individuals emerged within European integration. It is thus interesting to explore how 
such specific policies contributed to the framing of individuals and citizenship in the 
Community. 
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The principle of free movement contained the thrust of the idea of economic 
integration.  Through abolishing previously pervasive boundaries between national 
markets as well as political entities, it was believed that not only would Europe 
prosper economically, but also peacefully (Haas 1958; see further Rosamond 2000: 
50-68). But, as has been shown, the exact content and scope of free movement was 
not entirely clear in the Treaty of Rome. Subsequently, a series of legislative acts 
sought to underpin the principle with policy. In short, the policy measures11 did so by 
affirming that the principle of free movement connected to individuals primarily as 
workers and secondarily as spouses or families of these workers.  
 
For instance, Regulation 1612/68 was a sweeping piece of legislation which in 
remarkable language underlined the principle of free movement for the idea and 
functioning of European integration. Interestingly, it stated in its “preamble” that 
“(…) freedom of movement constitutes a fundamental right of workers and their 
families.” The principle was further linked to guaranteeing “the possibility of 
improving his living and working conditions and promoting his social advancement.” 
In this setting, the status of individuals within European integration was thus linked, 
not only to their potential partaking in the common market, but also to their basic 
well-being. Interpreted broadly, the wording of this regulation thus implies that the 
individual citizen – still primarily in her capacity as a worker – were to be seen as an 
end in herself and not only as a means for amalgamating markets. This was further 
underlined in Regulation 1251/70 which stated that post-work, citizens had a qualified 
right – generally based on work – to remain in the territory where they had worked 
without being national citizens. European citizens were thus granted a kind of 
membership based on what could be called “qualified residence.” What qualified for 
rights enjoyed under European law was participation as workers, albeit increasingly 
linked to a broader conception of their worth qua individuals. This orientation was 
upheld by the subsequent Regulation 1408/71 which laid down the principles for the 
europeanisation of social rights in the wake of free movement of persons. Here, the 
aim was to facilitate free movement and mobility in Europe through transnationalising 
certain social rights and benefits linked to work and family.  
 
In this sense, even though it was still the citizen-as-worker that was at the forefront of 
the relationship between European integration and the individual, a somewhat broader 
conception of citizenship was slowly evolving. This is especially visible if we take the 
cue from the identity-question of what binds citizens together within a community. 
The free movement legislation does not cast this question only in purely technocratic 
terms. Emphasising that free movement is created for individuals as well as 
collectives – for the potential improvement of the individuals’ social (and economic) 
well-being – can be interpreted as a first approximation of a European identity that 
would bind individuals together, going beyond the image of the worker or market 
actor. This is also evident in the importance granted to the need for “equality of 
treatment” based on ideas of the “freedom and dignity” of individual citizens as in 
Regulation 1612/68. Obviously, these scattered points cannot be interpreted as laying 
                                                 
11
 Due to the limited space in this paper, the analysis will focus on the following three legislative acts: 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the community; Regulation (EEC) No 1251/70 of the Commission of 29 June 1970 on the right 
of workers to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State; 
Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security 
schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community.  
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the ground for any “thick” and comprehensive form of identity akin to those based on 
language, a common heritage and history or ethnicity. It is rather a very “thin” 
conception of citizenship centred on constraints in terms of the scope of rights and 
participation – the worker is still at the forefront of the status of individuals. Still, as 
De Búrca (1995: 29) argues, “[i]n the face of the apparently overwhelmingly 
economic impetus of the Community, the language of fundamental rights offered 
potential to articulate and establish a place for other values.” What needs to be further 
investigated is therefore the extent to which the integration process after its initial 
phase fostered broader conceptions of citizenship not only rooted in economically 
circumscribed rights, but also geared towards a grounding in notions of political 
community or unity, belonging and participation beyond the private sphere of the 
market. 
 
European Integration 1951-1971: Affecting Individuals, “What Kind” 
of Citizenship? 
The analysis focusing on four distinct, but inter-related instances of European 
integration has provided a first take on what kind of conceptions of citizenship that 
have emerged in the process. In summarising and synthesising the findings of the 
preceding empirical and conceptual accounts, I will shed light on the perceived 
similarities and differences between the instances – in short: the trajectory regarding 
conceptions of citizenship in the initial period of European integration. 
 
At the outset it is clear that issues concerning citizenship throughout the period 
analysed were linked to the dynamics of integrating markets in Europe. Individuals 
were rendered as significant through their function as workers or consumers – as 
(potential) participants in the common market. Rights were primarily linked to this 
narrow inclusion of individuals in the mode of integration. In this sense, there was no 
clear notion of what European citizens would have in common, surpassing their 
function as “factors of production” (Plender 1976: 39). If one can impute any notion 
of identity in this period it was clearly rooted in economic enterprise – citizens were 
not perceived as taking directly part in a political project with further collective aims. 
The collective aim of peace in Europe, so to say, was perceived to be reachable 
through market integration, not by integrating citizens politically or culturally. 
 
Nevertheless, there were some differences between the four instances pointing to a 
certain trajectory regarding conceptions of citizenship. Not surprisingly, the 
conception of citizenship was less sectoral and limited in the Treaty of Rome than in 
the ECSC Treaty. One can impute a more basic market citizenship in the former 
compared to the clearly sectoral and embryonic citizenship in the latter. 
Notwithstanding these differences in the scope of incipient citizenship politics, on the 
whole, both treaties signified market actors as the primary category of citizens within 
the system.  
 
The market vision of the founding treaties was persistent in the seminal rulings of the 
ECJ. Still, through these rulings it was established that individual citizens had certain 
European rights enforceable against the Member States. The citizenship elements of 
the treaties were mainly incipient and implicit, through the ECJ they were clearly 
more pronounced and put on the table, so to say. The domains in which the Court 
ruled were very much linked to economic integration – its adjudication was in the first 
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place centred on the functioning of the common market. Still, it did focus on the rights 
of individuals derived from the Treaty of Rome as more than an international treaty.12 
Thus, through a more marked notion of membership a supranational conception of 
citizenship emerged, possibly creating the impetus for later discussions on European 
identity, culture and citizenship. The membership assertion was furthered in 
subsequent free movement legislation towards the end of the initial phase of European 
integration. Even though the focus was still on economic integration and creating a 
common market, several of these legislative acts emphasised free movement as a 
fundamental right of citizens-as-workers.  
 
In terms of the time frame, the vocabulary thus shifted from no explicit mentioning of 
rights in the treaties, via acknowledging the link between citizens and the Community 
as a legal-political entity through certain rights, to perceiving these as fundamental for 
traversing boundaries between markets, if not the settled territorial borders of nation-
states. These findings point to an increasing awareness of the citizens qua individuals 
already in the first phase of European integration. Still, the prevailing impression is 
anyhow one where the citizen in the initial phase of European integration was 
secondary to the aim of integrating states. The integration of workers and citizens 
seems mainly to have been a facilitator for the macro-political aim of market 
integration and peace-building in Europe. This is further highlighted by the fact there 
were no duties to participation inherent in these conceptions of citizenship. The 
emphasis was always on how the political or collective unit – the Community – could 
facilitate participation in the Common Market. Again, this is indicative of the very 
partial conception of citizenship geared mainly towards limited rights linked to the 
function of work. The analysis has thus showed that the image of the citizen was not 
at the forefront of integration efforts – conceptions of citizenship rather developed as 
the scope of principles and policies gained practical momentum. Citizenship in this 
phase was then not so much a practice in itself, as a very partial, derivative individual 
status dependent on emerging legal, legislative and political practices within the 
system. 
 
Thus, the analysis of four events, instances and junctures in the first phase of 
European integration can be summarised as in the following table: 
                                                 
12
 This was highlighted in Van Gend en Loos: “The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a 
common market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, 
implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between 
the contracting parties. This view is confirmed by the Preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to 
governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions 
endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens. 
Furthermore it must be noted that the nationals of the states brought together in the Community are 
called upon to cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the intermediary of the 
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.” 
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Table 2. Conceptions of Citizenship in European Integration, 1951-1971 
 
 
Significance of event – 
logic of integration 
Dimensional assertion Overall conception of 
citizenship 
ECSC (1951) Institutional 
establishment of 
European integration 
 
Highly sectoral and 
technocratic 
 
Exclusive focus on 
individuals as coal-and- 
steel-workers, and to 
some extent as 
consumers 
 
Rights to movement 
linked exclusively to 
function and 
participation in labour 
 
Partial, sectorally 
defined embryonic 
citizenship 
EEC (1957) Institutional 
establishment of 
European Economic 
Community 
 
Broadly market-based 
Focus on individuals as 
workers 
 
But tension because 
principle of non-
discrimination in its first 
approximation (art. 7) 
transcends the notion of 
the worker and focuses 
merely on nationality 
 
Free movement rights 
explicitly linked to 
workers and to facilitate 
participation in the 
inner market 
 
Fundamental market 
citizenship 
ECJ judicial activism 
(1960s) 
Legal interpretations of 
relation between 
Community law and 
national law as well as 
individual rights 
deriving from the 
treaties 
Rights linked to 
economic 
enterprise/participation 
and the functioning of 
the common market 
 
Assertion of direct 
effect of European 
rights in nation-states 
 
Citizenship-as-rights 
for workers 
Free movement 
legislation (1960s-
70s) 
Legislative measures 
building on the free 
movement provisions 
of the EEC Treaty 
 
Rights still linked 
primarily to workers 
 
Some tendencies 
towards emphasising 
rights qua individuals 
 
Transnationalising 
membership through 
rights of residence in 
second countries, but 
still qualified through 
prior work in the 
territory. 
Qualified citizenship-
as-residence 
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Concluding Remarks 
In general terms, the analysis of this paper has demonstrated how facets of citizenship 
crystallised around certain dimensions – be it in explicit or implicit fashion – creating 
a link between individual citizens and the emerging European political system. 
Connecting to broader debates on citizenship – national, European and global – the 
question of what the analysis further entails can be raised. Can we interpret the 
creeping emergence of citizenship issues in the EU as a nascent post-national 
citizenship (see Habermas 1996, 1998; Curtin 1997)? Was it already in the initial 
phase of integration pointing towards what Gerstenberg (2001: 312) has deemed 
”[the] promise to release the ideas of citizenship and democracy from territorial 
sovereignty and shared nationality”? Or, is it rather indicative of conceiving 
citizenship in ways which empties it of substantial content – of the means for 
meaningful political communication among citizens – and renders it, in the words of 
Thaa (2001), as a “lean citizenship”?  
 
The analysis of this paper has merely provided a first conceptual overview of the 
kinds of conceptions of citizenship that can be interpreted from the initial period of 
European integration. To answer the above questions in a cursory manner, what this 
analysis has illuminated is the strong emphasis on the individual citizen in the 
founding period of the EU as an actor in private, in something approximating a 
Hegelian civil society of economic matters, shielded from the public character of a 
democratic citizen (Hegel 1952 [1821]). It is therefore closer to a “lean citizenship” – 
in this case a fractional status within the realm of the market – than a genuinely 
political citizenship beyond and above the nation-state. This is, however, not 
surprising, given the market impetus of European integration in the period at hand. 
But, what has also been shown is that different dimensions of citizenship – especially 
rights and participation through the link to work and free movement – no longer were 
circumscribed exclusively by the borders of nation-states.  
 
A final methodological caution and remark is, however, warranted. The analysis in 
this paper is preliminary and rudimentary insofar as it has had a narrow focus in terms 
of sources. These have been drawn from treaties, case law and legislative acts within 
the Community system. As these can be seen as the official institutional, political and 
judicial expressions of the Community, they provide some important clues to the 
puzzle regarding what kind of conceptions of citizenship that emerged within 
European integration in the period analysed. Still, a potential criticism could certainly 
be that this provides a too narrow understanding of “incipient” European citizenship. 
Granted, a deeper and broader understanding of citizenship within the process would 
require looking not only at these official – and in a sense final – sources, but also at 
preparatory documents and reports, as well as, if available, debates involving different 
actors. Finally, the reception of these legal frameworks, judicial verdicts and policies 
in press and public debate could also shed light on the issues of citizenship that were 
raised in the initial phase of European integration. The analysis of this paper has thus 
only provided some first clues which would need to be backed up and corroborated or 
refuted by more diverse sources of data. Having stated this methodological caution, 
the paper has nevertheless brought about some important insights that provide a 
starting point for investigating subsequent developments of explicit citizenship 
politics within European integration from the Copenhagen Summit in 1973 and 
onwards.  
 
Espen D.H. Olsen 
16 
 
 
Bibliography 
Aron, R. (1974): “Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?”, Social Research 41(4): 
638-656. 
Bartolini, S. (2006): “A Comparative Political Approach to the EU Formation”, Arena 
Working Paper 4/2006. Oslo: Arena. 
Bauböck, R. (1994): Transnational Citizenship. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Bauböck, R. (2003): “Multilevel Citizenship and Territorial Borders of the EU 
Polity”, Working Paper no. 37, IWE – Working Paper Series. Wien: 
Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 
Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998): Legitimacy and the European Union. London: 
Longman. 
Bellamy, R. (2004): “Introduction: The Making of Modern Citizenship”, in R. 
Bellamy, D. Castiglione and E. Santoro (eds.): Lineages of European 
Citizenship. Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation-States. 
London: Palgrave. 
Brubaker, W.R. (1992): Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Conant, L. (2002): Justice Contained. Law and Politics in the European Union. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Costa, O. (2003): “The European Court of Justice and Democratic Control in the 
European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy 10(5): 740-761. 
Curtin, D. (1997): Postnational Democracy: The European Union in Search of a 
Political Philosophy. The Hague: Kluwer Law. 
De Búrca, G. (1995): “The Language of Rights and European Integration”, in J. Shaw 
and G. More (eds.): New Legal Dynamics of European Union. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Dinan, D. (2004): Europe Recast. A History of the European Union. Houndmills: 
Palgrave.  
Gerstenberg, O. (2001): “Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic 
Constitutionalism: The Case of the European Community”, Ratio Juris 14 (3): 
298-325. 
Gillingham, J. (2003): European Integration 1950-2003. Superstate or Market 
Economy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Griffiths, R.T. (2000): Europe’s First Constitution. The European Political 
Community, 1952-1954. London: Federal Trust. 
Haas, E.B. (1958): The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Habermas, J. (1996): Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Habermas, J. (1998): The Inclusion of the Other. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 
Heater, D. (1999): What is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1952 [1821]): Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Isin, E. (2002): Being Political. Genealogies of Citizenship. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press.  
Jachtenfuchs, M., T. Diez and S. Jung (1998): “Which Europe? Conflicting Models of 
a Legitimate European Political Order”, European Journal of International 
Relations 4(4): 409-445. 
Work, Production, Free Movement and Then What? 
 
17 
Kostakopoulou, T. (2001): Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European 
Union. Between Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Maas, W. (2005): “The Genesis of European Rights”, in Journal of Common Market 
Studies 43(5): 985-1001.  
MacCormick, N (1999): Questioning Sovereignty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nelsen, B. and A. Stubb (eds.) (2003): The European Union. Reading on the Theory 
and Practice of European Integration. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Neunreither, K. (1995): “Citizens and the Exercise of Power in the European Union: 
Towards a New Social Contract”, in A. Rosas and E. Antola (eds.): A Citizen’s 
Europe. In Search of a New Order. London: Sage. 
Plender, R. (1976): “An Incipient Form of European Citizenship”, in F.G. Jacobs 
(ed.): European Law and the Individual. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing. 
Preuss, U. (1998a): “Citizenship in the European Union: a Paradigm for Transnational 
Democracy?”, in D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds.): Re-Imagining 
Political Community. Cambridge: Polity Press.  
Preuss, U. (1998b): “The Relevandce of the Concept of Citizenship for the Political 
and Constitutional Development of the EU”, in U. Preuss and F. Requejo 
(eds.): European Citizenship, Multiculturalism, and the State. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
Rosamond, B. (2000): Theories of European Integration. Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Schnapper, D. (1998): Community of Citizens. On the Modern Idea of Nationality. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. 
Taylor, C. (1985): Human Agency and Language. Philosophical Papers 1. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thaa, W. (2001): “’Lean Citizenship’: The Fading Away of the Political in 
Transnational Democracy”, in European Journal of International Relations 
7(4): 503-523. 
Weiler, J.H.H. (1999): The Constitution of Europe. ”Do the New Clothes Have an 
Emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wiener, A. (1998): ‘European’ Citizenship Practice. Building Institutions of a Non-
State. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. 
 
 
